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LESSONS FROM INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES: GOVERNING
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS’ THIRD-
PARTY STANDARD
Tammi S. Etheridge*
Almost one hundred years ago, Henry Ford, as CEO of the Ford Mo-
tor Company, announced a plan to cease payment of special dividends to
shareholders.1  Instead, the company would reinvest its profits to employ
more workers and build more factories.  Investing in new workers and fac-
tories would cut the cost of cars and make them affordable to more peo-
ple.2  Ford publicly declared that his “ambition [was] to employ still more
men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possi-
ble number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.  To do this
we are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business.”3
Minority shareholders were outraged.  Two minority shareholders in par-
ticular, the Dodge brothers,4 brought suit seeking to stop Ford’s plans.5
The Dodge brothers argued that the primary purpose of a company is to
maximize shareholder profits, not to help the community.6  The trial court
agreed with Dodge and ordered Ford to pay the special dividends to its
shareholders.7  Ford appealed.  The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that a “corporation is organized primarily for the profit of the
stockholders,” not for the benefit of the community or its employees.8
* The author graduated from the University of Minnesota Humphrey School of
Public Affairs in May 2013 and the University of Minnesota Law School in December 2013.
She is currently a Judicial Law Clerk for Judge Joseph R. Goodwin of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The author extends her gratitude to
Professor Claire Hill of the University of Minnesota Law School for her comments, feedback,
encouragement, and support, as well as her colleague Tony Au for his editorial assistance.
She would also like to express thanks to the editors at the Michigan Business &
Entrepreneurial Law Review for their hard work, patience, and dedication.
1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 669 (Mich. 1919).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. An alternative backstory provides that Ford did not want to pay dividends to his
competitors, the Dodge brothers. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New
Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 1–2 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law &
Econ. 2d Series, Working Paper No. 373, 2007), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/files/373.pdf.
5. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 669.
6. Id. at 683.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does
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Dodge v. Ford is the seminal case for the property model of corporate
law.  The property model propounds the view that the sole purpose of any
solvent corporation is to maximize the wealth of its owners.9  In contrast,
the entity model of corporate law maintains that a corporation can simul-
taneously serve multiple constituencies and is thus “tinged with a public
purpose.”10  The past few decades have seen the proliferation of new busi-
ness models purporting to advance such a public purpose, including hybrid
nonprofits, low-profit limited liability companies, and “flexible purpose
corporations.”11  Consumer and investor demand have driven the creation
of a sizeable marketplace for companies that put public purpose, not
profit, at the center of business.12  Yet, while some business models have
progressed to the point of taking the community into account, the law has
not.  For-profit companies that benefit the public are not considered in the
existing legal framework.13  As such, some states have adopted “benefit
corporation” statutes to create a more accommodating framework.14  The
statutes permit a benefit corporation to consider mixed goals in its opera-
tion while working in tandem with preexisting corporate law.15
To date Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and West Virginia have
not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution
of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”).
9. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
51, 53 (2012), available at http://www.ssireview.org/pdf/Summer_2012_In_Search_of_the_Hy
brid_Ideal.pdf.
12. The last three decades have seen the growth of so-called socially responsible in-
vesting. A 2010 report on socially responsible investing trends in the United States found that
companies identified as socially responsible controlled roughly ten percent of all domestic
assets under management, approximately $3.07 trillion (mostly in mutual funds). SOC. INV.
FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 8, 10 (2010), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/10_Trends_Exec_
Summary.pdf.
13. Under the letter of many current state laws, a company that chooses to prioritize a
public benefit over profits would violate its fiduciary duties to the company’s owners. See
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 648. In practice, however, state courts have not enforced shareholder
wealth maximization, with no case other than Dodge operationalizing this rule. Jonathan R.
Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev.
177, 180-81 (2008); see also Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3
Va. L. Bus. Rev. 163 (2008).
14. Hawaii has decided to call its version of a benefit corporation a “sustainable busi-
ness corporation.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (2011).
15. These statutes allow directors of benefit corporations to consider both people and
the planet along with profits. See Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Ver-
sion 1.0—A Breakthrough in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1063
(2011) (discussing the “triple bottom line” concept).
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adopted benefit corporation statutes into state corporate law.16  Alaska,
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Puerto
Rico, and Wisconsin have introduced benefit corporation legislation.17
Most of these states have adopted the model legislation proposed by B
Lab,18 or its basic structure and content, as their corporate benefit stat-
utes.19  These benefit corporations are thus statutorily committed to “1) a
corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on society and the
environment; 2) expanded fiduciary duties of directors which require con-
sideration of non-financial interests; and 3) an obligation to report on its
overall social and environmental performance as assessed against a com-
prehensive, credible, independent, and transparent third-party
standard.”20
Generally, the benefit corporation statutes require a corporation’s
charter to state that it is obligated to pursue a general public benefit that
will create a positive impact on society and the environment as a whole, to
be assessed against a third-party standard.21  The benefit corporation is
then obligated to publish an annual benefit report wherein the corpora-
tion’s performance is measured against the third-party standard.22  Al-
though the statutory definition of “third-party standard” is verbose,
benefit corporation statutes do not go far enough in providing for the crea-
tion or regulation of meaningful standards.  Without careful monitoring,
the proliferation of public benefit corporations could easily promote the
growth of a monopolistic, standard-providing organization of the Institu-
16. State by State Legislative Status, Enacted Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR.,
http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
17. Id.
18. B Lab is a non-profit organization whose mission, according to its website, is “us-
ing the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.” The Non-Profit Be-
hind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-
b-corps (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
19. Differences in a state’s business entity statutory scheme, legislators, bar associa-
tions, practitioners, business community, and so on lead to small variations in benefit corpo-
ration legislation. Yet the essential provisions are largely identical. The Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation (MBCL) is a collection of the strongest provisions from enacted
statutes. B Lab has presented the MBCL to states as the ideal legislation to provide for the
existence of benefit corporations. Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://
benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation (last visited June 3, 2015).
20. WILLIAM H. CLARK & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION 1 (2013), available at http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/
Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_18_2013.pdf.
21. Critics have called this mission into question. Delaware Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Strine has said, “[Benefit corporations exist in] a fictional land where you can take other
people’s money, use it as you wish, and ignore the best interests of those with the only right
to vote.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corpora-
tions Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 150 (2012).
22. Reporting Requirements by State, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefit
corp.net/reporting-requirements (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
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tional Shareholder Services (ISS) type.  The creation of such an organiza-
tion would endanger the primary purpose of implementing an open third-
party standard policy—transparency.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the structure of
benefit corporation statutes, outlining the provisions associated with the
statutorily mandated goals of corporate purpose, accountability, and trans-
parency.  Part II compares the third-party standard to ISS’s third-party
corporate governance rating system for general corporations.  Part III ex-
plains how some of the concerns associated with ISS’s corporate govern-
ance rating system are applicable to the third-party standard despite
proponents’ arguments to the contrary.
I. BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES
A. Public Benefit as Corporate Purpose
According to the Benefit Corp Information Center, a benefit corpora-
tion “is a new class of corporation that voluntarily meets higher standards
of corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.”23  Statutorily, a
benefit corporation must have a purpose of creating “general public bene-
fit” and is permitted to identify one or more specific public benefit pur-
poses.24  By definition, a general public benefit is a “material, positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as assessed
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a bene-
fit corporation.”25  The Model Legislation offers a nonexhaustive list of
potential specific public benefits.  The list includes
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with
beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for indi-
viduals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of
business; (3) preserving the environment; (4) improving human health; (5)
promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the
flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and (7) conferring any
other particular benefit on society or the environment.26
According to the Model Legislation, “[t]he creation of general public ben-
efit and specific public benefit . . . is in the best interests of the benefit
corporation.”27
23. Business FAQ’s, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/business (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
24. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (B Lab, 2013), available at http:/
/benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf. See, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5–6C–06(a)(1), (b)(1) (LexisNexis 2014).
25. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102. There are some variants. Under the
New Jersey statute, a general public benefit is “a material positive impact on society and the
environment by the operations of a benefit corporation through activities that promote some
combination of specific public benefits.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18–1 (2011).
26. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102(a).
27. Id. § 201(c).
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B. Accountability
 Benefit corporation directors, in managing the business, must consider a
wide variety of stakeholders.  Directors must
consider the effects of any action or inaction upon: (i) the shareholders of the
benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and workforce of the benefit corpora-
tion, its subsidiaries and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of customers as benefi-
ciaries of the general public benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the
benefit corporation; (iv) community and societal factors, including those of
each community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its
subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment;
(vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, includ-
ing benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term
plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the contin-
ued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability of the bene-
fit corporation to accomplish its general benefit purpose and any specific
public benefit purpose . . . 28
Directors are also bound to “any other pertinent factors or the interests of
any other group” as they deem appropriate.29
C. Transparency and the Third-Party Standard
To assure its commitment to a particular public benefit and to provide
increased transparency for its stakeholders, the benefit corporation must
file an annual benefit report with the Secretary of State,30 make it availa-
ble to all of the company’s shareholders, and post the report on its website
so that the broader public has access to it.31  The report should include a
description of the manner in which the corporation sought to impute a
public benefit, the success of that effort, the manner in which the corpora-
tion sought to impute a specific benefit (if any are stated in the company’s
articles), the success of that effort, any circumstances that may have hin-
dered the effort, and the rationale for the selection of the third-party stan-
dard used to prepare the benefit report.32  To dispel any concerns about
selection of the third-party standard, the Model Legislation requires the
annual report to include a list of material shareholders and a statement
concerning any connection between the benefit corporation and the third-
party standard.33  In this way, stakeholders are kept apprised of relation-
ships that could be perceived as controversial.  Lastly, and perhaps most
significantly, the annual report must include
an assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of the
benefit corporation against a third-party standard: (i) applied consistently
with any application of that standard in prior benefit reports; or (ii) accompa-
28. Id. § 301(a)(1).
29. Id. § 301(a)(2).
30. Id. § 402(d).
31. Id. § 402(b)–(c).
32. Id. § 401(a)(1).
33. Id § 401(a)(6).
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nied by an explanation of the reasons for: (A) any inconsistent application; or
(B) the change to that standard from the one used in the immediately prior
report.34
The third-party standard is arguably the heart of benefit corporation legis-
lation.  The Model Legislation defines “third-party standard” as
a recognized standard for defining, reporting and assessing overall corporate
social and environmental performance that is:
(1) Comprehensive because it assesses the effect of the business and its op-
erations upon the interests listed in section 301(a)(1)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).
(2) Developed by an entity that is not controlled by the benefit corporation.
(3) Credible because it is developed by an entity that both:
(i) has access to necessary expertise to assess overall corporate social
and environmental performance; and
(ii) uses a balanced multistakeholder approach to develop the standard,
including a reasonable public comment period.
(4) Transparent because the following information is publicly available:
(i) About the standard:
(A) The criteria considered when measuring the overall social and
environmental performance of a business.
(B) The relative weightings, if any, of those criteria.
(ii) About the development and revision of the standard:
(A) The identity of the directors, officers, material owners, and the
governing body of the entity that developed and controls revisions
to the standard.
(B) The process by which revisions to the standard and changes to
the membership of the governing body are made.
(C) An accounting of the revenue and sources of financial support
for the entity, with sufficient detail to disclose any relationships that
could reasonably be considered to present a potential conflict of
interest.35
Proponents of the statute claim that the assessment and disclosure of
the benefit corporation’s overall social and environmental performance
against a third-party standard allows the company’s shareholders and the
public to easily evaluate the company.36  The third-party standard is thus
meant to promote due diligence by these two groups.  Proponents also
argue that consumers will use the third-party standard to differentiate
good deeds from good marketing, and thus the standard will improve cus-
tomer loyalty and facilitate greater investment in benefit corporations.37
Finally, advocates opine that the third-party standard process may result in
a market-driven positive feedback loop that rewards companies with
34. Id. § 401(a)(2).
35. Id. § 102(a). Similar third party standards have been included in a number of the
benefit corporation statutes that have been introduced, including those introduced in Iowa,
Maine, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. See S. Study B. 1188, 86th Gen. Assemb., 2015 Sess.
(Iowa 2015); H. Paper 792, 127th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015); H.B. 534, 2015 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); H.B. 1039, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015).
36. CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20, at 19.
37. Id. at 20.
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higher standards of corporate governance and levels of overall social and
environmental performance.38
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RATING SYSTEMS AS AN ANALOGOUS
ENDEAVOR
A. Institutional Shareholder Services and Corporate Governance
Researchers, investors, and policymakers commonly hold that the
quality of corporate governance can affect a corporation’s performance.39
This view is naturally accompanied by a heightened interest in corporate
governance40 and a concomitant interest in measuring the quality of cor-
porate governance arrangements.  The increased attention to corporate
governance has incentivized some shareholder advisors to develop govern-
ance metrics to inform the investment decisions of institutional inves-
tors.41  Yet efforts to measure are complicated.  Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) is a case study of how such metrics can be exceedingly influ-
ential and not an unambiguous force for good.  ISS and its subsidiary
RiskMetrics operated the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) sys-
tem42—the most influential shareholder-advisor-developed ranking sys-
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Perform-
ance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 267 (2008) (reporting a correlation between various measures of
corporate governance and firms’ operating performance); Bernard S. Black et al., Does Cor-
porate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 366, 410–11 (2006) (reporting evidence that corporate governance is an important fac-
tor in predicting the market value of Korean firms).
40. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development, 21 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 91, 91 (2006) (“Corporate governance . . . has now become a main-
stream concern—a staple of discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings, and
policy circles around the globe.” (italics omitted)); Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Esti-
mates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 94 (2008) (“Over
the last decade, a series of important empirical articles have evaluated the impact of many
levers of corporate governance on firm value and performance.”).
41. See generally Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 4–13 (Euro-
pean Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 02, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 (noting the impact of institutional investors’
growing presence and the demand for governance-related services).
42. The CGQ had several iterations since its inception. Currently, ISS markets ISS
Quickscore 3.0: “QuickScore uses a numeric, decile-based score that indicates a company’s
governance risk relative to their index or region. A score of 1 indicates relatively lower gov-
ernance risk, and, conversely, a score of 10 indicates relatively higher governance risk. Com-
panies receive an overall QuickScore and are also assessed across four pillars: Board
Structure, Compensation/Remuneration, Shareholder Rights, and Audit & Risk Oversight.”
See ISS Quickscore 3.0, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/investment-
tools-data/quickscore/ (last visited May 21, 2015); see also Mike Sheehan, There They Go
Again: ISS Introduces Yet Another Corporate Governance Measure, VENABLE, LLP (Feb. 8,
2013), https://www.venable.com/files/Publication/f9583253-d578-4f7d-9a6f-b35b8c4cd7df/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a4e4d88c-5208-406a-9292-b917b5148560/ISS-Introduces
-Yet-Another-Corporate-Governance-Measure.pdf.
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tem in the world.43  The organization’s sway was far-reaching.  A 2006
New York Times article, for example, reported estimates that ISS advice
affected the “governance decisions of professional investors controlling . . .
half the value of the world’s common stock.”44  Moreover, RiskMetrics
rated the governance arrangements of more than 7400 companies in more
than thirty markets.45  These numbers exemplify the level of power that
one standard-providing organization can obtain.
ISS gained its initial sway over corporate America through its proxy
advisory company.  Over the past twenty-five years, institutional share-
holders such as mutual funds and pension funds grew dramatically.46  Dur-
ing the same period, the United States government expanded the types of
issues that must be decided by shareholders to include issues such as board
appointments, mergers, stock issuances, and the “say on pay” vote.47  In-
stitutional shareholders, which own billions of shares in thousands of pub-
lic companies,48 are thus entitled to vote on tens of thousands of matters
every year.49  The cost and time associated with researching every item
would be exponential.  To mitigate this cost, most institutional sharehold-
ers hire a third party, a proxy advisory company, to advise them on votes.
ISS was able to acquire such a large share of the proxy advice-seeking
market because it had the first-mover advantage.50  ISS then leveraged its
advantage to create its own rating system by which it could justify its proxy
decisions.
Investors were not the only ones to rely on these ratings as indicators
of the quality of a company’s corporate governance; professionals also re-
43. See Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Govern-
ance Ratings? 1, 4 (Stanford Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 360, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152093 (not-
ing that RiskMetrics is the largest commercial rater).
44. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2006, at S3.
45. RISKMETRICS GROUP, INC., REGISTRATION STATEMENT (FORM S-1/A) 91 (2007),
available at http://ir.msci.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1047469-07-8328&CIK=1295172 (“Our
CGQ ratings currently cover more than 7,400 companies across 34 countries, with underlying
data for up to 70 individual corporate governance variables.”).
46. Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-
Concentration in the United States, 5 EUROPEAN MGMT. REV. 11, 12 (2008).
47. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
48. Luis A. Aguilar, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2013) http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171
515808#.VR7V4_nF_pdf.
49. Charles M. Nathan, Future of Institutional Share Voting Revisited: A Fourth Para-
digm, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Sept. 27, 2011) http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/09/27/future-of-institutional-share-voting-revisited-a-
fourth-paradigm/.
50. See generally Birger Wernerfelt, Brand Loyalty and User Skills, 6 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 381 (1985) (stating that as consumer experience with a brand increases, so too does
the consumer’s reliance upon that particular brand, reinforcing consumer brand loyalty).
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lied on corporate governance ratings.  Lawyers, for example, advised pub-
lic company clients on how to manage their CGQ scores for the benefit of
their companies.51  Public companies boasted about their high CGQ
scores.52  RiskMetrics offered public companies fee-based consulting ser-
vices for improving their CGQ scores,53 and the popular “Yahoo! Fi-
nance” web site included CGQ scores in companies’ online profiles.54
Additionally, academics used the CGQ system to measure the quality of
firms’ governance arrangements.55  Researchers analyzed the link between
RiskMetrics’s governance scores and firm performance, tried to assess
which the CGQ factors that affected firm valuation, and used companies’
CGQ scores to study governance differences between banking and non-
banking firms.56  Most relevant, however, is the power that RiskMetrics
universally yielded over corporate governance despite a complete lack of
corresponding checks or balances.
B. ISS’s Corporate Governance Ratings (The “CGQ”)
The Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) was derived from ISS’s
Governance Analytics platform.57  According to ISS, Governance Analyt-
51. See, e.g., What’s Your “CGQ” IQ? What Every Corporate Executive Should Know
About the Corporate Governance Quotient, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & DONNELLY LLP (Jan. 4,
2007), http://www.oppenheimer.com/News/Default.aspx?id=1410.
52. See, e.g., Monica Langley, Want to Lift Your Company’s Ranking on Corporate
Governance? Buy the Test, WALL ST. J., (June 6, 2003, 12:38 AM) http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB105485006531971100 (revealing that after paying for “premium” corporate-govern-
ance services, Aetna released a press release saying “‘Aetna earns high ranking on corporate
governance’ with a near-perfect score of 99.7 by ISS, an ‘independent provider of proxy vot-
ing and corporate governing services.’”).
53. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHARE-
HOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
ON PROXY VOTING 10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf (noting
that ISS “offers corporate governance consulting services to help clients understand and im-
prove their corporate governance ratings”).
54. Yabing Jiang et al., Web-Based Corporate Governance Information Disclosure: An
Empirical Investigation, in 4 WEB TECHNOLOGIES: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, &
APPLICATIONS 2479, 2486 (Arthur Tatnall ed., 2010) (“[ISS] provides [corporate governance
grades] free on the ‘company profile’ pages on Yahoo Finance (http://yahoo.finance.com).”).
55. See, e.g., Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene´ M. Stulz, Why Do Countries
Matter So Much for Corporate Governance?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 11–12 (2007) (using firms’
CGQ scores as a proxy for the quality of their corporate-governance arrangement); Vidhi
Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance Norms and Practices (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 165, 2007) (studying the relationship between
CGQ scores and their components and firm value); Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson,
Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 21–24 (Feb.
12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=859264 (reconstructing the CGQ Index to find correlation between governance and
firm value).
56. Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 55, at 21–24.
57. Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 401 (2009).
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ics was “a dynamic corporate governance rating tool that helps investors
manage investment risk and drive value while also helping corporations
perform peer analysis and benchmark their corporate governance prac-
tices.”58  The system considered sixty-five factors in formulating each U.S.
company’s CGQ.  The sixty-five rating factors fell into eight different cate-
gories: (i) Board, (ii) Audit, (iii) State of Incorporation, (iv) Executive and
Director Compensation, (v) Qualitative Factors, (vi) Ownership, (vii) Di-
rector Education, and (viii) Charter/Bylaws.59  The system then assigned
two distinct ratings.  One rating compared the company to its industry
peer group (for example, travel and leisure, or healthcare equipment and
services), while the other compared the company to its relative market
index (for example, S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400, or Small Cap 600).60  Given
the proprietary nature of the system, the weight assigned to each variable
and sub variable was always unknown.61  The organization weighted the
variables according to its determination of their relative importance.62
C. The Trouble with ISS and CGQ
 As ISS grew, criticism of the proxy advisory industry increased.  A 2011
white paper from the Center on Executive Compensation, outlines the cri-
tiques in three succinct arguments.63  First, the report argues that there are
inherent conflicts of interest in the ISS structure.64  ISS provided consult-
ing services to the same corporations that are subject to the ISS proxy
recommendations.  The report states that “[t]his approach creates a vi-
cious cycle in which companies may feel an obligation to patronize ISS for
its consulting services in order to obtain favorable proxy voting recom-
mendations on their proposals.”65  Next, the report argues that “the lack
of transparency of the advisory firms’ analytical models makes it ex-
tremely difficult for investors or companies to determine why a proxy ad-
visor has made certain determinations or to correct factual inaccuracies
before a vote is held.”66  Lastly, the report notes concerns that “inaccurate
information is being transmitted to investors.”67
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (explaining that the relative importance of each variable changes over time and
that ISS reserves the right to add or subtract factors from the CGQ, or change a factors
weight, based on current corporate governance trends).
63. CTR. ON EXEC. COMPENSATION, A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY
INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT
(2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhite
Paper02072011.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 85.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id.
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The list of grievances against ISS, and its CGQ specifically, is signifi-
cantly longer.  Accusations of conflicts of interest,68 faulty analysis, errors
or omissions impacting CGQ ratings,69 hiring relatively unskilled employ-
ees to conduct governance analysis,70 being “blatantly opportunistic” in
peddling its services,71 and following the fads of the time instead of devel-
oping sound corporate governance policies72 abound.  Legal scholar Lynn
Stout has noted the following:
[T]here is reason to doubt whether ISS analysts have particularly good insight
into what makes for ‘good corporate governance.’ Instead, ISS seems to sim-
ply follow governance fads and fancies. [For example, ISS’ position on stag-
gered boards and other anti-takeover protections is] extreme . . . and relies on
some flawed academic studies that looked only at how anti-takeover protec-
tions affected share price around the time a takeover bid was made, and ig-
nores evidence that anti-takeover defenses can enhance share performance
measured over longer periods.73
Despite these criticisms, ISS services are still used because, as Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Strine explained, “[f]ollowing ISS constitutes
a form of insurance against regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having a
large sway in the affairs of American corporations.”74
68. E.g., Gretchen Morgenson, How to Succeed on Wall Street, Conflict-Free, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at S3.
69. See Langley, supra note 52 (quoting Patrick McGurn, ISS Senior Vice-President, as
stating that, “occasionally we miss one” and acknowledging that in at least one instance ISS
“had not made the [appropriate] disclosures nor check[ed] the reports to see if it had.” Mc-
Gurn then stated, “We screwed up . . . [and ISS] was embarrassed by the [revealed] opera-
tional misstep.”).
70. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007)
(“ISS . . . has been known to use relatively unskilled temporary employees to conduct gov-
ernance reviews . . . .”) (citing Eleanor Laise, Is This the Most Influential Man on Wall
Street?, SmartMoney Mag., Oct. 16, 2002, available at http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/index
.cfm?story+oct02-influential).
71. Langley, supra note 52 (statement of Agilent Technologies Inc.’s General Counsel,
Craig Nordlund) (“[I]t would be rating [Agilent] on its corporate governance and that, for a
fee of $16,000, [ISS] could provide guidance [to Agilent] on improving its scores . . . [t]his is
blatantly opportunistic. I feel less like we’re getting rated and more like we’re getting pres-
sured to buy another product.”).
72. See Joann S. Lublin, Turning the Tables: RiskMetric’s Head Faces His Day of
Shareholder Judgment, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at C1.
73. Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be the New Master of the Corporate Governance
Universe? DOWJONES CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006, at 14–15 (guest column).
74. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005).
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III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ISS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO
CONCERNS ABOUT THE THIRD-PARTY STANDARD
A. The Option to Choose a Third-Party Standard
1. Third-Party Standard Selection Based on Minimal Auditing
One of the primary concerns regarding implementation of a third-party
standard is the benefit corporation’s ability to choose any third-party stan-
dard.  Selection of the third-party standard is critical because it allows the
benefit corporation to shop around for a third-party standard according to
how well a given standard will highlight the corporation’s accomplish-
ments and minimize its failures.  Presently, the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI), GreenSeal, Underwriters Laboratories (UL), ISO2600, Green
America, and B Lab all provide commonly used standards for the use of
benefit corporations.75  Both GRI and B Lab offer their reporting and
assessment tools for free.  And while these few companies are the most
popular, there are at least 100 more organizations that provide rating ser-
vices for corporate sustainability practices.76
Interestingly, B Lab, the proponent of the Model Legislation, has de-
veloped its own standard77—much like ISS monopolized the proxy advi-
sory field and subsequently developed the CGQ.  According to its website,
B Lab’s mission is “to use the power of business to solve social and envi-
ronmental problems.”78  To achieve its mission, B Lab promotes the adop-
tion of its Model Legislation, which allows for the formation of benefit
corporations, certifies a qualifying corporation as a “Certified B Corpora-
tion,” and hosts a database of verified social and environmental perform-
ance data for private companies.79  “Certified B Corporation” status
75. LYNNE A. WEIKART ET AL., BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 318 (Charisse Kiino et al. eds., CQ Press 2013).
76. The research and consulting firm SustainAbility has conducted a study called
“Rate the Raters” that aims “to better understand the universe of external sustainability
ratings and to influence and improve the quality and transparency of such ratings.” Rate the
Raters, SUSTAINABILITY (2010), http://www.sustainability.com/projects/rate-the-raters. Thus
far the study has been implemented in five phases.  Phase one considered the evolution of the
corporate sustainability ratings agenda and identified the trends and challenges associated
with the ratings process.  Phase two was created to illuminate the breadth and depth of the
ratings system by inventorying over 100 ratings and their attributes and by surveying global
sustainability experts. Phase three uncovered best practices by parsing through the feedback
of certain ratings organizations and offers recommendations.  Phase four shares Sus-
tainAbility’s vision for the future of ratings.  Lastly, phase five offers four deliverables: Pol-
ling the Experts 2012, The Company Perspective, The Investor View, and The Raters
Response. For more information about SustainAbility’s work, visit http://
www.sustainability.com/projects/rate-the-raters.
77. The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). (“B Corps are certified by
the nonprofit B Lab to meet rigorous standards of social and environmental performance,
accountability, and transparency.”).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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means that the corporation has met B Lab’s standards as a socially respon-
sible corporation.80  Certification itself, according to the B Lab website,
begins with a self-assessment wherein the applicant considers its “overall
impact . . . on its stakeholders.”81  B Lab staff accepts the submission with
payment, then reviews the self-assessment and any additional supporting
documentation.82
More than 794 corporations and limited liability companies have been
certified as B Corporations.83  B Lab’s website lists these certified B Cor-
porations, maximizing the companies’ potential to be profiled and al-
lowing them to promote themselves as such.84  The privileges associated
with certification thus enhance a corporation’s ability to market its goods
and services and to attract capital.  Yet B Lab’s certification process in-
volves auditing only in the loosest sense of the word.  In fact, despite re-
laxed certification standards, B Lab anticipates conducting site visits only
once every ten years.85  In the interim, the organization relies on self-as-
sessments from the benefit corporations.86  The slack certification process
also calls into question the likelihood that a benefit corporation could be
decertified.  The B Lab website does not disclose any procedure by which
a failing benefit corporation would lose its certification or whether such a
procedure exists.87  It is unlikely that a decertification procedure would
exist because the act of decertifying a benefit corporation would result in
diminished fees for B Lab.
2. First-Mover Advantage
Although the corporate governance industry includes multiple play-
ers,88 ISS operates to this day with little competitive pressure.  An anemic
80. How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Find a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp (last
visited Dec. 12, 2013).
84. See, e.g., What makes Greyston Bakery and New Belgium Brewing Best for the
World?, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/blog/what-makes-greyston-bakery-and-new-
belgium-brewing-best-the-world (last visited June 5, 2015).
85. See B Lab Visits B Corps in Mexico, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/blog/b-
lab-visits-b-corps-in-mexico (last visited June 5, 2015) (“B Lab annually visits 10% of certi-
fied companies for an onsite review to maintain the authenticity of the Certified B Corp Seal
and verify the accuracy of all the answers in the company’s B Impact Assessment.”).
86. Id.
87. See How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
88. See Rose, supra note 70, at 899 (“There are about a half-dozen well-established
firms in the U.S. corporate governance industry, and a few others who operate in Asia and
Europe.” In the U.S., the most significant market players were the Corporate Library and its
subsidiary, Board Analyst; Glass Lewis; GovernanceMetrics International; ISS; Proxy Gov-
ernance, Inc.; and the credit rating agencies, Egan-Jones, Moody’s Inc. and Standard &
Poor’s.).
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level of competition means that the organization with a monopoly share is
subject to few checks.  One of the key reasons that RiskMetrics was sub-
ject to such little competition is that it reaped the benefits of being the first
mover.  The first-mover advantage theory posits that the first group enter-
ing a new industry will gain the advantage and then create barriers, which
are sometimes insurmountable, for new entrants.89
Professors Lieberman and Montgomery published the seminal paper
on first-mover advantage.90  According to Lieberman and Montgomery,
one of the advantages to being the first mover is the network effect.91  In a
separate paper, Lieberman expounds on the network effect, explaining
that it occurs when “[t]he positive feedback that is generated causes the
market to tip in favor of the firm that emerges as the standard, potentially
leading to a winner-take-all market structure . . . .  In markets with net-
work effects, the leading firm is likely to capture disproportionate
returns.”92
Presently, B Lab has garnered some name recognition.  If B Lab be-
comes the leading standard provider, the entire industry will exhibit net-
work effects that will inure to the benefit of B Lab.  Benefit corporations
by and large would try to fall in line with B Lab’s standards.  In other
words, if B Lab is able to dominate benefit corporation governance early,
the resulting network effects will serve to reinforce its prominence in the
industry.  In this way, the unspoken rule will be to adhere to the standards
promulgated by the most popular entity—likely the first mover—despite
the best intentions of forming a competitive market.  As with ISS, such a
result could foreseeably result in incompetence, self-interested dealing, or
both.  B Lab is already well on its way to acquiring first-mover status.  It
has established its place by propping itself up as the go-to company for
benefit statutes.  B Lab will thus be in a position to chill the market. This is
concerning because a disregard for high standards could result in a univer-
sally diminished benefit corporation ideal.
89. See generally Gurumurthy Kalyanaram et al., Order of Market Entry: Established
Empirical Generalizations, Emerging Empirical Generalizations, and Future Research, 14
MARKETING SCI. G212, G212 (1995); Roger A. Kerin, et al., First-Mover Advantage: A Syn-
thesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 J. MARKETING 33, 33–34
(1992); Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATE-
GIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE: STRATEGY CONTENT RES.) 41, 41 (1988); David Szymanski et
al., Order of Entry and Business Performance: An Empirical Synthesis and Reexamination, 59
J. MARKETING 17, 17 (1995); Pieter VanderWerf & John F. Mahon, Meta-Analysis of the
Impact of Research Methods on Findings of First-Mover Advantage, 43 MGMT. SCI. 1510, 1510
(1997).
90. See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 89.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Marvin B. Lieberman, Did First-Mover Advantage Survive the Dot-Com Crash? 7
(Dec. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/
marvin.lieberman/working_papers/InternetFMA.pdf.
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3. Confusion from Too Many Standards
Benefit corporation supporters believe that allowing benefit corpora-
tions to select their own standards will promote the development of new
standards, creating competition among the standard-providing organiza-
tions so that the market will find its own equilibrium.93  But this is pre-
cisely the problem.  The proliferation of standards could easily result in
either watered-down standards or standards that are meaningless to the
general public.  BBWoof, Inc., a Maryland benefit corporation, provides a
good example.  BBWoof is a typical Certified B Corporation.  It sells “eco-
friendly pet supplies, Fair Trade items, and merchandise sourced from lo-
cal and North American companies, with preference given to small manu-
facturers and minority owned companies.”94  BBWoof must utilize a
standard that is capable of quantifying the company’s activities.95  The “B
Consumer Report” on the company website has a composite score of 94.2,
an environmental score of 10.7 points earned, with a value of 55 percent.96
But the report does not include any information on what these scores
mean.  Moreover, it is unclear from the report whether the assessment was
based on a third-party standard and, if so, what third-party standard was
used.  The report also fails to disclose exactly how BBWoof’s business af-
fects the environment.
As the BBWoof example illustrates, an increase in the number of stan-
dards will precipitate a parallel increase in public confusion.  The Model
Legislation would have better served states and benefit corporations by
providing a small, set number of standards and associating each standard
with a specific type of public benefit.  Simple regulation, in this case,
would facilitate clarity and comprehension.
B. No Mandatory Benefit Report Verification Process
1. Need for External Benefit Report Auditing
Benefit corporation statutes and the Model Legislation do not require
benefit corporations to have their reports certified or audited.97  In con-
trast, federal laws and regulations require publicly traded companies to
facilitate independent financial audits and disclose specified financial and
93. See CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20.
94. About the Woof, THE BIG BAD WOOF, http://www.thebigbadwoof.com/page/about
woof?n=aboutbbw&s=aboutwoof (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
95. See MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-08 (West 2015) (“(a) A benefit cor-
poration shall deliver to each stockholder an annual benefit report including: (1) A descrip-
tion of: (i) [t]he ways in which the benefit corporation pursued a general public benefit
during the year and the extent to which the general public benefit was created.”).
96. Benefit Corp Reports, The BIG BAD WOOF, http://www.thebigbadwoof.com/files/
My%20B%20Report2011.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
97. Benefit Corp v Certified B Corp, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/
what-makes-benefit-corp-different/benefit-corp-vs-certified-b-corp (last visited Apr. 14,
2015).
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non-financial information to shareholders and the general public.98  Cor-
porations may also undergo procedural audits to evaluate and assess the
corporation’s practices and procedures.  External auditing in this way is
designed to serve a regulatory purpose, ensuring that companies act in a
fiscally responsible manner and provide honest disclosures about their fi-
nancial practices and economic situation.  In fact, many firms that are not
obliged by law to perform external audits nonetheless contract for such
services.99  Yet the benefit reports associated with benefit corporations do
not undergo nearly as rigorous a review process.100
The absence of external auditing is especially conspicuous given that
benefit corporations purport to act in the public’s best interest.  Propo-
nents of the status quo argue that mandatory verification was intentionally
excluded from the benefit corporation requirements.  They compare bene-
fit corporation legislation with securities regulation, arguing that the SEC
requires financial reports only for publicly traded companies101 while pri-
vate companies are regulated by state corporate statutes that do not re-
quire audited financial reports.102  Like private corporations, proponents
of the status quo argue, benefit corporations should not be forced to pro-
vide audited reports of any sort, especially benefit reports regarding their
social and environmental performance.103  However, it is precisely be-
cause benefit reports make assertions regarding social and environmental
performance that they should be audited.  Benefit corporations, unlike
traditional corporations, owe a duty to the public at large, not just to
shareholders.  As such, they should be held to a more exacting standard,
wherein they are accountable to the general public for both their claims
and their outcomes.
2. Accountability for Failure to Perform
The Model Legislation insulates benefit corporations,104 their of-
ficers,105 and their directors,106 from any monetary liability for nonfea-
sance.  A corporation could claim to pursue a general or specific public
benefit, hoping to garner new business without actually doing so.  Support-
ers of the Model Legislation claim that mandatory verification, defined as
98. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AUDIT QUALITY, GUIDE TO PUBLIC COMPANY AUDITING 3,
available at http://www.thecaq.org/docs/for-investors/guide-to-public-company-auditing.pdf?
sfvrsn=0.
99. Audits, External, INC.COM, http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/audits-external.html.
100. To be fair, some benefit corporation legislation makes the use of a third party to
prepare or audit the annual report mandatory. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)(2).
101. CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20, at 25.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(a)(2) (B Lab, 2013), available at
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf.
105. Id. at § 303(c).
106. Id. at § 301(c).
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any process by which the public benefit is authenticated, is undesirable
because it would subject benefit corporations, their officers, and their di-
rectors to fraud liability for reporting false or misleading information.107
Even if failure to create a public benefit was actionable, a benefit corpora-
tion could avoid fraud liability by omitting any substantive claims from its
annual report without repercussions.  Because no external agency audits
benefit reports, such a maneuver would likely go unnoticed by the general
public.
Assuming, arguendo, that a claimant chose to bring an action against a
benefit corporation for failure to perform, the claimant would likely have
little recourse because a buffer—the standard promulgator—stands be-
tween the benefit director and any accusation of wrongdoing.  The benefit
director could easily shift blame to the standard provider for any misrepre-
sentations in the benefit report by claiming that she believed the benefit
corporation was following the standards as laid out by the standard pro-
mulgator.  It is unlikely that the standard creator owes any duty to the
standard user108 or to the institutional investors who rely on the standard
in their investment decisions.
3. Costs
Proponents of the Model Legislation claim that any mandatory verifi-
cation process would be cost prohibitive.109  In this view, organizations
will voluntarily create third-party standards from which benefit corpora-
tions can generate a benefit report, but will likely be unwilling to perform
verification services at no charge.  Because a large annual cost for verifica-
tion services would impose a financial hurdle on small businesses, adopt-
ing mandatory verification would also likely reduce the statute’s adoption.
However, it is just as likely that the external verification of annual reports
would help benefit corporations attract more capital by creating a sort of
“bonding mechanism.”110  Bonding in this sense would mean that the
agent (the benefit corporation) has aligned its incentives completely with
the incentives of the principal (the investor) and that there is strong evi-
dence of this alignment in the form of the verified report.111  The verified
report thus guarantees that the benefit corporation is sincere in its com-
107. CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20, at 25.
108. “Unlike corporate managers, neither institutional investors, as stockholders, nor
ISS, as a voting advisor, owe fiduciary duties to the corporations whose policies they seek to
influence.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards A True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response
to Lucian’s Solution for Improving Corporate America 11 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 541, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu
/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Strine_541.pdf.
109. CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20, at 25.
110. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing
bonding mechanisms).
111. This conceptualization of a bonding mechanism would work best if the benefit
corporation awarded additional compensation to officers after a successful report audit.
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mitment to the benefit corporation model and helps the corporation to
garner greater confidence in its claims about environmental and social
performance.
C. Lack of Third-Party Standard Accreditation
1. Inadequate Corporate Governance and ISS
Without an effective accreditation mechanism, benefit corporation
standard-setting organizations will likely follow the same path that ISS and
RiskMetrics pioneered.  RiskMetrics claimed to conduct over 4000 statisti-
cal tests to examine the link between governance variables and sixteen
measures of risk and performance.112  This exhaustive study resulted in
the CGQ and its sixty-four variables that were weighted according to their
correlation with firm risk and prior performance.  RiskMetrics would also
regularly change its ratings model and weights to reflect current market
trends in corporate governance.113  But outside parties could not indepen-
dently confirm these studies, resulting in an unreliable system.  One study,
for example, analyzed the association between CGQ and the recommen-
dations that ISS gave its corporate clients.114  Researchers found that the
association was extremely weak, meaning that there was little substantive
relation between the CGQ rating and an ISS recommendation.115  The re-
sult implied that ISS did not use its own measures when developing voting
recommendations for shareholders.116  Clearly, a problem exists when an
organization will not rely on the standards and ratings it has created.
The same researchers also analyzed the relationship between CGQ and
shareholder voting outcomes.117  They defined the voting outcome as a
percentage of votes cast in favor of a proposal or a candidate director.118
The researchers found that when the ISS recommendation was included in
the analysis, the coefficient on the CGQ became negative.119  In other
words, the higher the CGQ rating, the lower the percentage of votes that
were actually cast in favor of the proposal.  This means that the CGQ has
no statistically significant relationship with voting outcomes.  While many
corporations sought the ISS/RiskMetrics stamp of approval, the fact of the
matter was that the rating score had absolutely no success in predicting
firm performance.  A thorough accreditation process early on would have
112. Daines et al., supra note 43, at 12.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 40.
115. Id. at 42 (“Again the relation between CGQ and ISS recommendations is statisti-
cally significant, but substantively small, with a one-point . . . increase in CGQ translating
into 0.17 (4.70) percentage-point increase in the probability that ISS recommends a vote for a
director.”).
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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revealed how little the CGQ score could actually predict and thus stymied
the rapid growth of the RiskMetrics monopoly.
2. Need for Standard Governance
Standard governance in the form of an effective accreditation mecha-
nism can allow benefit corporations to avoid the pitfalls that the ISS legacy
demonstrates.  The Model Legislation provides that the open third-party
standard must be comprehensive, credible, independent, and transpar-
ent.120  Advocates argue that the definition of the open standard is suffi-
cient because it accords with the best practice criteria for standard
developers used by various international standards organizations, includ-
ing the American National Standards Institute, the International Stan-
dards Organization, and the International Social and Environmental
Accreditation and Labeling, as well as regulatory bodies such as the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission.121  In the author’s view, however, the open
standard is insufficient because it does not impose constraints on standard-
setters. This creates the potential for opportunism and inconsistency.  Al-
though less precise than a rule, the third-party standard has the potential
to constrain in much the same way that a policy does. In other words,
lawmakers should formulate third-party accreditation provisions in a way
that amounts to a meaningful check on would-be benefit corporations.
Most other groups in the corporate governance space are unable to
make policy without undergoing various checks and balances.  An exam-
ple of this is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its rule-making
procedures that establish the standards for SEC decisions and create a sys-
tem for decision-monitoring by third parties.122  Likewise, the New York
Stock Exchange must abide by the external controls, resulting from Sec-
tion 19(b)(1) of the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934123 and
Rule 19b-4,124 in its rule-making process.  These rule-making procedural
requirements promote transparency in the decision-making process.  Yet
the Model Legislation does not curtail the standards promulgators in any
similar respect.  Absent any restrictions, the standards-promulgating orga-
nizations will default to self-regulation. This opens the door to both in-
competence and self-interested dealing.
120. Criteria for Acceptable Third Party Standards, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/third-
party-standards/criteria-for-acceptable-third-party-standards (last visited May 22, 2015).
121. CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 20, at 25.
122. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
123. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll).
124. Rule 19b-4 requires the NYSE to file a notice of any rule changes with the SEC. 17
C.F.R. 240.19b-4 (2008).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Transparency is a critical component of sound corporate govern-
ance.125  It can manifest in a number of ways.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, for example, requires accurate and timely disclosure to improve
transparency.126  The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance man-
date the “timely and accurate disclosure . . . [of] all material matters re-
garding the corporation.”127  The SEC seeks to correct information
asymmetries by requiring all registered public companies to disseminate
information to constituents at the same time.128  The Business Round-
table, an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies,
instructs companies to consider the need for candor and for timely disclo-
sure in any communication with their investors.129  Transparency allows
stakeholders the opportunity to monitor and exert control over a corpora-
tion’s actions.  Without transparency, the individuals who make up the
corporation are responsible only to themselves and thus run the risk of
exhibiting opportunistic and self-serving behavior.130
In one form of transparency, the Model Legislation weeds out financial
influence by requiring standard-providing organizations to disclose an ac-
counting of their financial supporters.  Financial support includes funds
such as fees, grants, investments, and in-kind support.131  Theoretically,
these disclosures are available to the public and report financial contribu-
tions in sufficient detail to inform the public of all relationships that could
possibly present a conflict of interest.  Additionally, the reporting arm of
the Model Legislation requires the benefit corporation’s annual benefit
report to include a statement confessing any connections to the third-party
standard, its officers, directors, or material owners, which includes any fi-
nancial or governance relationships that might affect the credibility of the
third-party standard’s objective assessment.132  While these efforts are
125. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Sta. 745 (codified in
various sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004) [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES],
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf; BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2012) available at http://business-
roundtable.org/studies-and-reports/business-roundtable-principles-of-corporate-governance-
2012/.
126. See SEC Proposes Additional Disclosures, Prohibitions to Implement Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-150.htm (last
modified Oct. 16, 2002).
127. See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 125, at 22.
128. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–03 (2000).
129. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 125.
130. See, e.g., Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1556 (2008) (examining
the interplay between secrecy, transparency, and agency costs).
131. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab, 2013), available at http://
benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf.
132. Id.
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laudable, the lessons of ISS indicate that they may not be enough to estab-
lish an effective level of transparency.
ISS was allowed to manage its corporate governance ratings operations
free from any market or regulatory checks.  The lack of transparency in
ISS’s operations produced several valuable lessons.  First, the lack of
transparency meant that no third party could adequately monitor the sys-
tem.  Therefore, ISS’s clients were handicapped in their ability to obtain
the information they needed to effectively monitor the company and make
their own business decisions.  Because the company was immune from
scrutiny, there was also no incentive for ISS to correct or improve any
system deficiencies—system deficiencies that resulted in a great deal of
misinformation.  Stakeholders, then, are required to trust that ISS is doing
its job ethically and effectively.
Third-party standard providers for benefit corporations will likely ac-
quire the same level of success as ISS.  Consequently, the public should be
leery of encountering the same concerns, specifically, a lack of trans-
parency, including undefined analytic models, inaccurate and incomplete
information, and conflicts of interest.  Going forward, the public should
also be especially mindful of standard-providing organizations that also
sell consulting services.  As more states pass benefit corporation legisla-
tion, it is imperative that these issues be addressed and that solutions be
proposed.  Lax and uneven implementation of the third-party standard
could mean that benefit corporation regulation, despite being a noble
cause, quickly becomes defunct or, worse, meaningless.  To preserve the
power of business to solve social and environmental problems, we must
address the appropriateness of the option to choose a third-party standard,
the absence of a benefit report verification process, and the lack of third-
party standard accreditation.
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